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RE-EXAMINING THE MOUNT LAUREL DOCTRINE AFTER THE DEMISE OF THE 
COUNCIL ON AFFORDABLE HOUSING: A CRITIQUE OF THE BUILDER’S 
REMEDY AND VOLUNTARY MUNICIPAL COMPLIANCE 
 
Corey Klein 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In its landmark 1975 decision in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of 
Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 67 N.J. 151 (1975), the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that 
municipalities must use their zoning powers in such a way to provide low- and moderate- income 
residents with a realistic opportunity to afford housing within their borders.
1
 The court found that 
Mount Laurel Township had used its zoning powers to effectively exclude lower income 
residents.
2
  
In 1983, the court reaffirmed the basic premise of Mount Laurel I in Southern Burlington 
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 92 N.J. 158 (1983), and made 
the doctrine enforceable by giving developers an incentive to initiate exclusionary zoning suits.
3
 
This incentive came to be known as the “builder’s remedy.”4 When a builder proposes a 
development that includes affordable housing and a municipality denies the proposal for 
violating local zoning codes, the developer may challenge the denial on the grounds that the 
municipality has not complied with the Mount Laurel doctrine.
5
 If a court determines that the 
municipality had not complied with the Mount Laurel doctrine, the court may permit the 
developer to construct the project despite violations to the local zoning code and invalidate the 
offending zoning provision for excluding affordable housing.
6
 
                                                 
1
 S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 67 N.J. 151, 180, 209 (1975). 
2
 Id. at 209. 
3
 S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 92 N.J. 158, 214, 236-37 (1983). 
4
 Id. at 214, 279-81. 
5
 Id. 
6
 Id. 
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The flood of litigation that followed Mount Laurel II caused the New Jersey State 
Legislature to pass the Fair Housing Act of 1985.
7
 The Fair Housing Act created the Council on 
Affordable Housing (COAH), an administrative agency tasked with determining the amount of 
affordable housing each New Jersey municipality was required to provide to comply with the 
Mount Laurel doctrine.
8
 In Hills Dev. Co. v. Twp. of Bernards, 103 N.J. 1 (1986), numerous 
municipalities challenged the Act’s constitutionality under the Mount Laurel doctrine; however, 
the court upheld it, supporting the Legislature’s intent to move affordable housing issues away 
from the judiciary.
9
 
The Fair Housing Act created a system that permitted municipalities to seek certification 
from COAH to show that they had substantially complied with the Mount Laurel doctrine.
10
 
Municipalities could choose whether to participate by filing a Fair Share Housing Plan with 
COAH seeking COAH certification. By doing so, a municipality was insulated from builders’ 
remedy suits.
11
 The COAH process had been under judicial review, and the Supreme Court and 
Appellate Courts invalidated COAH’s methodology for calculating municipal affordable housing 
obligations on several occasions.
12
 These judicial challenges eventually led the Legislature to 
propose an end to COAH.
13
 Although this proposed legislation was never enacted, Governor 
Christie abolished the agency by executive order in June, 2011.
14
 
                                                 
7
 Fair Housing Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329.19 (West 2011). See Alan Mallach, The Mount Laurel 
Doctrine and the Uncertainties of Social Policy in a Time of Retrenchment, 63 Rutgers L. Rev. 849, 850 (2011) 
(stating that, “The decision spawned well over 100 lawsuits, prompting the New Jersey legislature to enact the New 
Jersey Fair Housing Act in 1985.”). 
8
 § 52:27D-302. See Hills Dev. Co. v. Twp. of Bernards, 103 N.J. 1, 31-40 (1986). 
9
 Hills Dev. Co., 103 N.J. 1, 63-64 (1986). 
10
 § 52:27D-313. 
11
 §§ 52:27D-309(b), 316(b). 
12
 See infra Part II.A-B. 
13
 S. 1, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010). 
14
 STATE OF N.J., EXEC. DEP’T, REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 001-2011, A PLAN FOR THE ABOLITION OF THE COUNCIL 
ON AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND PROVIDING FOR THE TRANSFER OF THE FUNCTIONS, POWERS, AND DUTIES OF THE 
COUNCIL ON AFFORDABLE HOUSING TO THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS (2011), available at 
http://www.nj.gov/dca/services/lps/hss/transinfo/001-2011.pdf. 
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Municipalities have strong incentives to resist the construction of affordable housing in 
their jurisdictions. By saddling the responsibility of paving the way for affordable housing on 
municipalities, the Mount Laurel doctrine is viewed by critics as an affront to sound planning 
principals, a catalyst for urban sprawl, an attack on the environment, and a financial burden that 
local budgets are ill-equipped to handle.
15
 These criticisms were echoed by Governor Christie, 
who made public statements about allowing municipalities more say in their planning 
decisions.
16
 Ultimately, Governor Christie abolished the agency based on these criticisms.
17
 The 
appellate division invalidated Christie’s move to abolish COAH and the Governor has vowed to 
appeal that decision.
18
 
This Note discusses two aspects of the Mount Laurel decisions and their progeny: the 
voluntary compliance mechanism, which allows municipalities to decide how and where to 
permit construction of affordable housing within their boundaries subject to state approval, and 
the builder’s remedy, which allows developers to decide how and where affordable housing will 
be built within a municipality subject to state approval. 
An analysis of the recent history of COAH, and affordable housing in New Jersey 
generally, will show that COAH accomplished some good during its existence, but ultimately 
was destined to fail. By permitting municipalities and developers to decide how and where to 
                                                 
15
 See Daniel Carlson & Shashir Mathur, Does Growth Management Aid or Thwart the Provision of Affordable 
Housing?, in GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING: DO THEY CONFLICT? 20, 45-46 (Anthony 
Downs ed., 2004) (stating that, “There is a widespread public perception that the state’s affordable housing policy is 
a cause of urban sprawl”); Kaitlyn Anness, Gov. Christie orders COAH reorganization, MARLBOROPATCH, Aug. 29, 
2011, http://marlboro.patch.com/articles/gov-christie-orders-the-reorganization-of-coah (noting the financial 
burdens of rapid development); Mallach, supra note 7, at 864 (pointing to pressures on municipal officials to 
preserve open space while keeping taxes down). 
16
 Megan DeMarco, Gov. Christie Abolishes N.J. Council on Affordable Housing, THE STAR-LEDGER, June 29, 
2011, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/06/gov_christie_abolishes_nj_coun.html (quoting Christie as stating, 
“I’ve always believed that municipalities should be able to make their own decisions on affordable housing without 
being micromanaged and second guessed from Trenton.”). 
17
 STATE OF N.J., DEP’T OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, FAIR HOUSING ACT ADMINISTRATION, 
http://www.nj.gov/dca/services/lps/hss (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
18
 Matt Friedman, NJ. Appeals court overturns Christie’s decision to abolish Council on Affordable Housing, THE 
STAR-LEDGER, March 8, 2012, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/03/nj_appeals_court_overturns_chr.html. 
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build affordable housing, the goals of Mount Laurel are less likely to be reached. This is 
particularly true in a time of economic uncertainty that harms the bottom line of developers and 
municipal tax bases alike. Municipalities have an incentive to do as little as possible to avoid the 
“builder’s remedy” and developers have an incentive to build affordable housing only when it is 
accompanied by four times as much higher-end housing.  
Part II of this note takes a detailed look at the history of the Mount Laurel decisions and 
COAH, recent developments regarding legislative and executive action against COAH, and the 
remedies the judiciary provided to enforce the Mount Laurel doctrine. Part III discusses the 
wisdom of permitting private developers and local municipalities to determine the fate of 
affordable housing in New Jersey in light of criticism from affordable housing advocates and 
state officials who believe the system is not working. Ultimately, the problems with affordable 
housing in New Jersey rest not with COAH, but with the Mount Laurel decisions themselves. 
Rather than a town-by-town approach to affordable housing, the Courts should adopt a top-down 
approach to affordable housing that will determine where housing is built by looking at the state 
in regions. However, care must be taken to ensure that this is done in a way that still promotes 
Mount Laurel’s goals: affordable housing for low- and moderate-income residents and racial, 
economic, and social integration.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Mount Laurel Decisions 
In 1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that every developing municipality in the 
state must use its zoning power in a way to ensure that lower-income residents of the state have a 
realistic opportunity to afford housing with its borders.
19
 The Mount Laurel I decision arose from 
a lawsuit brought by the Southern Burlington County NAACP on behalf of African-American 
                                                 
19
 S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 67 N.J. 151, 174, 180 (1975). 
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residents of Mount Laurel Township. Those residents claimed they were denied an opportunity 
to construct decent housing within the municipality as a result of its exclusionary zoning 
ordinances.
20
  
The municipality zoned sixty-five percent of its land as “vacant” or for agricultural use, 
twenty-nine percent of its land for industrial use, and the remainder for residential use.
21
 The 
residential zone only permitted single-family detached homes.
22
 Attached townhouses, most 
apartments, and mobile homes were not allowed anywhere in the township.
23
 The court 
invalidated the ordinance on the grounds that the municipality had used its zoning power 
contrary to the general welfare clause of the New Jersey State Constitution.
24
 
The Court interpreted the general welfare clause of the New Jersey Constitution
25
 to 
mean that a zoning regulation “must promote public health, safety, morals or the general 
welfare.
26
 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court noted that the state’s police power must 
conform to substantive due process and equal protection of the laws.
27
 Therefore, as with any 
police power enactment, “a zoning enactment which is contrary to the general welfare is 
invalid.”28 Furthermore, the Court held that because shelter is one of the most basic human 
needs, adequate housing is “essential in promotion of the general welfare required in all local 
land use regulation.” 29 Clearly, the Court adopted a broad view of “general welfare” and held 
                                                 
20
 Id. at 180. 
21
 Id. at 161-62. 
22
 Id. 
23
 Id. at 163-70. 
24
 Id. at 180. 
25
 “All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are 
those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing 
and obtaining safety and happiness.” N.J. CONST. ART. 1, PAR. 1. 
26
 Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 175. 
27
 Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 174. 
28
 Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 175. 
29
 Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 178-79. 
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that every developing municipality must at least give an opportunity for appropriate housing for 
all through land use regulations.
30
 
The decision, although far-reaching, lacked an enforcement mechanism.
31
 It was widely 
ignored by local governments and lower court holdings interpreting it were inconsistent or 
contradictory.
32
 The first New Jersey Supreme Court case to fashion an enforcement mechanism 
for the Mount Laurel doctrine was Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 
481 (1977). In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that a municipality’s zoning 
ordinance was unconstitutional per Mount Laurel I.
33
 Developer-plaintiffs, who sought to build 
multi-family housing in the municipality, argued that the court should order the township to not 
only invalidate the ordinance, but grant them a zoning variance to build their project.
34
 The court 
reasoned that plaintiffs bore “the stress and expense of this public-interest litigation, albeit for 
private purposes”35 and that merely invalidating the ordinance could still leave them unable to 
build the project.
36
 Therefore, the court held that the trial court should direct defendant 
municipality to permit the development of the property.
37
 In so holding, the court pointed out 
that the property was “environmentally suited to the degree of density and type of development” 
proposed by developer-plaintiffs.
38
  
Eight years later in Mount Laurel II, the court extended the obligation to “provide a 
realistic opportunity for affordable housing for lower income households” to all municipalities in 
                                                 
30
 Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 180. 
31
 S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 92 N.J. 158, 260 (1983) (stating that 
despite the affirmative nature of Mount Laurel I, it afforded “no more than a theoretical, rather than realistic” 
opportunity for the construction of affordable housing. See also Mallach, supra note 7, at 850 (stating that the later 
decision, Mount Laurel II, “put teeth in the doctrine”). 
32
 Mallach, supra note 7, at 850. 
33
 Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Twp. of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 548 (1977). 
34
 Id. at 548-50. 
35
 Id. at 550. 
36
 Id. 
37
 Id. at 551. 
38
 Id. 
Klein 7 
the state.
39
 The doctrine had previously only applied to “developing” municipalities.40 The 
decision also upheld the use of a “builder’s remedy” similar to the one used in Oakwood.41 The 
ruling acknowledged that the passive remedies in Mount Laurel I were insufficient and could not 
produce much affordable housing.
42
 Over 100 lawsuits arose in response to the decision.
43
 This 
spurred the New Jersey legislature to take action.
44
 
 In 1985, the State Legislature enacted the Fair Housing Act
45
 to assign the task of 
enforcing the Mount Laurel doctrine to an administrative agency.
46
 The Legislature gave COAH 
the responsibility of determining municipal affordable housing obligations and the development 
of compliance mechanisms.
47
 The Fair Housing Act allows a municipality with a Fair Share 
Housing plan to petition COAH for certification to show that it has complied with its affordable 
housing obligations.
48
 Participation with the program is voluntary.
49
 However, if COAH grants 
certification, the municipality is protected from exclusionary zoning litigation (the “builder’s 
remedy”) for 10 years.50 In order to ascertain whether a municipality complied with the Mount 
Laurel doctrine, COAH would “adopt criteria and guidelines for municipal determination of its 
present and prospective fair share of the housing need in a given region.”51 The New Jersey 
                                                 
39
 S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 92 N.J. 158, 214, 236-37, 243-44 
(1983). 
40
 Id. at 240 (stating that, “The developing/non-developing distinction is therefore no longer relevant and the 
conclusion that fully developed municipalities have no Mount Laurel obligation is no longer valid”). 
41
 Id. at 218. 
42
 John M. Payne, Reconstructing the Constitutional Theory of Mount Laurel II, 3 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 555, 559 
(2000). 
43
 Mallach, supra note 7, at 850. Before the FHA, affordable housing obligations were determined on a case-by-case 
basis and the suits arose as a result of the absence of a comprehensive plan. Hills Dev. Co. v. Twp. of Bernards, 103 
N.J. 1, 21 (1986). 
44
 Mallach, supra note 7, at 850. 
45
 Fair Housing Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329.19 (West 2011). 
46
 Hills Dev. Co., 103 N.J. at 31-40. 
47
 Id. at 31-47. 
48
 § 52:27D-313. 
49
 § 52:27D-313(a). 
50
 Id. 
51
 § 52:27D-307. 
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Supreme Court upheld the Fair Housing Act in Hills Development Co. v. Township of Bernards, 
103 N.J. 1 (1986 (sometimes referred to as Mount Laurel III). The decision gave the courts a way 
out of the housing business, allowing the legislature to take on the task.
52
 In so deciding, the 
court recognized that an agency created by the Legislature is in a better position than the courts 
to enforce the Mount Laurel doctrine.
53
 
COAH promulgated specific criteria for determining a municipality’s affordable housing 
obligation, referred to as the First and Second Round Rules, adopted in 1987 and 1993 
respectively. These rules dealt with a municipality’s inherent need for affordable housing.54 The 
need was calculated using a complicated formula, taking into account a municipality’s amount of 
vacant land, employment growth, and income distribution.
55
  
COAH’s methodology for the first two rounds involved number-crunching of massive 
amounts of relevant data, including: 
Journey-to-work patterns, existing housing quality (year built, persons per room, 
plumbing facilities, kitchen facilities, heating fuel, sewer, and water), housing 
rehabilitation, household income, population projections, headship rates, 
household formation projections, housing price filtering, residential conversions, 
housing demolitions, equalized nonresidential property valuation (ratables), and 
undeveloped land.
56
 
 
As a result, municipalities were obligated to provide anywhere from zero to 1,000 units, 
the then-statutory cap.
57
 The second round was similar to the first in terms of methodology, but 
                                                 
52
 Hills Dev. Co., 103 N.J. at 49-52. 
53
 Id. at 24-25. See also S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 92 N.J. 158, 212-
14 (1983) (stating that the court was compelled to act, despite the fact that the legislature is better suited to address 
the problem of affordable housing in New Jersey, and that the court cannot wait for a “political consensus” to 
address the problem). 
54
 In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 and 5:95, 390 N.J.Super. 1, 23-27 (App. Div. 2007), cert. denied in 192 N.J. 72 
(2007). 
55
 Mallach, supra note , at 850-51. 
56
 David N. Kinsey, The Growth Share Approach to Mount Laurel Housing Obligations: Origins, Hijacking, and 
Future, 63 Rutgers L. Rev. 867, 869 (2011). 
57
 Id. 
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also took note of changes in census data.
58
 Furthermore, the rules allowed municipalities to 
reduce their fair share obligations through the use of “credits,”59 meaning reductions in the 
number of affordable housing units a municipality is required to provide. For example, COAH 
awarded credits for affordable housing constructed between 1980 and 1986, credits for 
“substantial compliance,” and a two-for-one credit was awarded for municipalities that permitted 
the construction of rental housing. COAH also awarded adjustments for municipalities without 
adequate infrastructure and permitted municipalities to satisfy 25 percent of their affordable 
housing obligations through age-restricted affordable housing.
60
 
In order to address concerns that COAH’s methodology was unfair and complex and the 
reality that significant development had taken place in New Jersey during the tenure of the first 
two rounds of housing obligations without a commensurate increase in affordable housing, 
advocates worked with COAH to create a different model for COAH’s Third Round.61 
COAH issued its Third Round Rules in 2004.
62
 The Third Round Methodology departed 
from the Second Round calculations in that it depended on a municipalities “growth share.” 63 
The growth share tied affordable housing obligations to the net increase in the number of jobs 
                                                 
58
 In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 and 5:95, 390 N.J.Super. at 25. 
59
 Id. 
60
 Id. 
61
 Kinsey, supra note 56, at 870-71 (detailing the origins of the growth share approach and stating, “As COAH's 
Second Round drew to a close in 1999, without even a public proposal from COAH for a Third Round fair share 
methodology or allocations for the next six year cycle, CAHE [the Council for Affordable Housing and the 
Environment] developed, refined and discussed on several occasions during 2000-2001 with COAH leadership a 
detailed growth share proposal. CAHE's goal was a simpler, fairer, more effective system of achieving constitutional 
housing obligations throughout New Jersey.”). CAHE is “a statewide group of planning, environmental and housing 
organizations and advocates” that seeks to increase affordable housing opportunities, to preserve New Jersey's 
natural resources, and to rebuild cities throughout the state.” About Us, COAL. FOR AFFORDABLE HOUS. & THE ENV., 
http://www.cahenj.org/aboutus/aboutus.html (last visited on Apr. 22, 2012).  
62
 In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 and 5:95, 390 N.J.Super. at 27-30. 
63
 Id. at 47. 
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and housing units a municipality would experience between 2004 and 2014.
64
 “Growth share” 
meant  
the affordable housing obligations generated in each municipality by both 
residential and non-residential development from 2004 through 2018
65
 
represented by a ratio of one affordable housing unit among five units constructed 
plus one affordable housing unit for every 16 newly created jobs as measured by 
new or expanded non-residential construction within the municipality.
66
  
 COAH reasoned that the growth share approach would be more in line with the Mount 
Laurel doctrine.
67
 COAH also asserted that the method would meet Mount Laurel’s “realistic 
opportunity” prong by ensuring that housing for low- and moderate-income residents is actually 
built.
68
 In addition to growth share, the rules addressed a municipality’s rehabilitation share69 and 
its unsatisfied prior round obligations.
70
 
The FHA permitted any compliance mechanisms to satisfy affordable housing 
obligations.
71
 These included requiring developers to pay for affordable housing, restricting unit 
ownership by age, allowing municipalities to gain additional “credits”72 for providing rental 
housing, allowing municipalities to send their affordable housing obligation to another 
municipality through Regional Contribution Agreements (RCAs),
73
 and allowing municipalities 
to gain credits for existing affordability controls.
74
 
B. Recent Developments 
                                                 
64
 Id. at 10. 
65
 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:96-10.1 (2008) (current version extends growth share period to 2018). 
66
 § 5:97-1.4. 
67
 In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 and 5:95, 390 N.J.Super. at 30. 
68
 Id. 
69
 “Rehabilitation” means “the renovation of a deficient housing unit, which is occupied by a low or moderate 
income household, to meet municipal or other applicable housing code standards”  § 5:94-1.4. 
70
 Prior round obligations were defined as unmet obligations left over from the First and Second Rounds. In re 
Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 and 5:95, 390 N.J.Super. at 27. 
71
 Fair Housing Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-311(a) (West 2011). 
72
 A “credit” is the equivalent of one affordable housing unit. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:92-6.1 (2007). 
73
 RCAs are contractual agreements voluntarily entered into by two municipalities wherein one municipality 
transfers up to 50 percent of its fair share housing obligation to another in exchange for monetary compensation. 
Fair Housing Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-312(a) (West 2012). 
74
 In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 and 5:95, 390 N.J.Super. at 67-68. 
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In January, 2007, the Appellate Division rejected the Third Round rules.
75
 Specifically, 
the Appellate court rejected COAH’s allowance of “filtering”76 and the notable absence of job 
growth and housing growth resulting from rehabilitation and redevelopment from the 
methodology.
77
  The decision criticized the growth share approach for potentially permitting 
municipalities to shirk their obligations by restricting growth.
78
 The appellate court affirmed 
COAH’s methodology for calculating a municipality’s rehabilitation share, decision to no longer 
“reallocate present need,”79 the use of RCAs, and regulations awarding credits, bonus credits and 
vacant land adjustments.
80
 The decision was appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court, which 
denied certification.
81
 Thereafter, COAH revised its third round rules again.
82
 The revised rules 
modified the growth share approach, ensuring that calculations as to projected growth were 
calculated by COAH itself, rather than the municipalities, in response to concerns that 
municipalities were underestimating future growth, or limiting growth, in order to avoid their fair 
share housing obligations.
83
 
In October 2010, the Appellate Division partially invalidated COAH’s revised Third 
Round Rules, particularly with respect to the growth share, to calculate projected affordable 
                                                 
75
 Id. at 87-88. 
76
 Filtering rests on the assumption that, as new housing is constructed for higher-income families, the overall 
increase in supply provides more housing opportunities for low- and moderate-income families. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 
5:92 App. A (2006). 
77
 In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 and 5:95, 390 N.J.Super. at 87-88. 
78
 “Any growth share approach must place some check on municipal discretion. The rules, as they currently exist, 
permit municipalities with substantial amounts of vacant developable land and access to job opportunities in nearby 
municipalities to adopt master plans and zoning ordinances that allow for little growth, and thereby a small fair share 
obligation.” In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 and 5:95, 390 N.J.Super. at 56. 
79
 “Present need consists of the indigenous need of a municipality and the fair share of the reallocated excess need of 
the municipality's present need region. Indigenous need is defined as substandard housing currently existing in any 
municipality.” AMG Realty Co. v. Warren Twp., 207 N.J.Super. 388, 401 (Law. Div., 1984). 
80
 In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 and 5:95, 390 N.J.Super. at 86. 
81
 In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 and 5:95, 192 N.J. 72 (2007). 
82
 Mallach, supra note 7, at 855. 
83
 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:97-1.1 (2008). 
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housing needs.
84
 The ruling invalidated the “growth share,”85 reasoning that the “growth share” 
would permit municipalities to limit growth to decrease their fair share obligation.
86
 The ruling 
asked COAH to adopt rules that resembling the First and Second Round rules
87
 and held that 
land use ordinances cannot require developers to provide affordable housing without incentives, 
such as increased densities and reduced costs.
88
 The ruling upheld “Smart Growth”89 and 
“Redevelopment” bonuses90 and rejected arguments that a lack of vacant land, sewer, and water 
capacity for development will result in municipal expenditures to create affordable housing, 
holding that municipalities in this position can petition the court for relief.
91
  
The New Jersey State League of Municipalities has appealed this ruling to the New 
Jersey Supreme Court.
92
 The case still has not been decided.
93
 The League is arguing that the 
growth share approach in the revised Third Round rules is flawed even though the growth share 
itself it still valid.
94
 
In January 2010, New Jersey State Senator Raymond Lesniak introduced S-1, a bill 
calling for an end to COAH.
95
 In June 2010, the bill passed the Senate by a margin of 28-3.
96
 The 
bill criticized COAH for increasing the judiciary’s role in affordable housing and creating 
                                                 
84
 In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 and 5:97, 416 N.J.Super. 462, 501 (App. Div. 2010). 
85
 Id. at 478-79. 
86
 Id. at 483. 
87
 Id. at 483-84. 
88
 Id. at 488-89 (citing Toll Bros. v. Twp. of West Windsor, 173 N.J. 502 (2002)). 
89
 “Smart growth” is defined as development in specified planning areas of the state. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:97-3.18 
(2008). 
90
 In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 and 5:97, 416 N.J.Super. at 495-96. 
91
 Id. at 504-505. 
92
 Letter from N.J. State League of Municipalities Executive Director William G. Dressler to N.J. State League of 
Municipalities members (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://www.njslom.org/letters/2011-0916-COAH-reorg.html. 
93
 Id. 
94
 Id. 
95
 S. 1, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010). 
96
 Peggy Ackermann & Claire Heininger, N.J. Senate Votes to Abolish Affordable Housing Council, move Control 
from State to Towns, STAR-LEDGER, Jan. 11, 2011, 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/06/nj_senate_disbands_coah_moves.html.  
Klein 13 
needless bureaucratic processes at the state and local level.
97
 The bill would give municipalities 
discretion in determining their affordable housing need
98
 and do away with state-imposed 
calculations of affordable housing need.
99
 The bill would decrease mandatory set-asides
100
 and 
amend N.J.S.A. § 40:55D-1 to make a housing element a mandatory part of a municipal master 
plan.
101
 The bill would also amend the Fair Housing Act “to prevent the State from calculating 
prospective need, in line with the original Mt. Laurel decision, which held that projected 
affordable housing ‘need’ numbers were not specifically required.”102 
In October 2010, the New Jersey State Assembly introduced its version of the bill, A-
3447.
103
 In January 2011, both houses approved an amended version of S-1/A-3447.
104
 The new 
bill required that at least 10% of the total housing units in most municipalities be dedicated to 
affordable housing, creating obligations in excess of what was required under COAH’s Round 
Three Rules for many municipalities.
105
  
Weeks later, Governor Christie issued a conditional veto of the bill.
106
 The veto stated 
that because twenty-five percent of the ten percent set aside must be met by “inclusionary 
development,” the approach “legislates sprawl.”107 It also criticized the legislation because it 
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 N.J. S. 1 § 1(d). 
99
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 Assemb. 3447, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010). 
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 Id. In New Jersey, a conditional veto allows the Governor to return a bill passed by both houses and brought 
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Governor’s objections, and bring it to his desk. It then becomes law once the Governor signs it. N.J. CONST. art. V, § 
1, para. 14(f). 
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 N.J. S. 1 (“Conditional Veto”). 
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would “fundamentally change the character” of municipalities.108 Finally, the veto stated that the 
legislation would push for burdensome new construction in environmentally sensitive areas.
109
 In 
order to address these concerns, Christie recommended that the Legislature pass a bill that more 
closely resembled the S-1 bill originally proposed by Senator Lesniak, which would have 
eliminated COAH. The bill required that one in ten housing units be designated as affordable, 
afforded municipal protection against builder’s remedy suits, eliminated commercial 
development fees, and allowed municipalities to avoid their affordable housing obligations by 
not developing.
110
 
On June 29, 2011, Governor Christie’s issued an Executive Order to abolish COAH.111 
The order consolidates COAH’s power with the Department of Community Affairs (DCA).112 
According to Governor Christie, consolidating the authority for housing in the DCA will reduce 
bureaucracy and foster predictability and consistency for developers and housing advocates.
113
 It 
would also curb procedural inefficiencies that result in unreasonable delays and costs to 
municipalities and the private sector. Finally, the Governor said the order would “appropriately” 
increase the availability of affordable housing throughout the State.
114
 As recently as September 
2011, Governor Christie also stated that the state’s commitment to creating affordable housing 
would continue.
115
 However, the Governor still does not have a choice in this matter as the New 
Jersey Supreme Court’s Mount Laurel decisions are still binding law. Soon after, DCA 
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 STATE OF N.J., EXEC. DEP’T, supra note 14. 
113
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implemented interim rules.
116
 The Appellate Division quickly upheld both the interim rules and 
Christie’s reorganization plan.117 However, the Appellate Division later overturned Christie’s 
abolishment of COAH. Christie said he would take that decision to the New Jersey Supreme 
Court.
118
 
C. Criticism of COAH 
Critics have insisted that COAH and the Mount Laurel doctrine encourage the spread of 
urban sprawl and overdevelopment of environmentally sensitive areas. The validity of these 
arguments has been questioned.
119
 Nonetheless, COAH united local governments charged with 
regulating zoning in their jurisdictions more than any other issue.
120
 While affordable housing 
planned in accordance with COAH regulations has often been built in accordance with “smart 
growth” principals,121 the builder’s remedy also facilitates “large developments built in 
greenfields.”122 This leads the public to believe New Jersey’s affordable housing policy 
contributes to urban sprawl.
123
 Still, the New Jersey Supreme Court insists that affordable 
housing be created in accordance with sound zoning principals
124
 and high density development 
can mitigate sprawl.
125
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2004). 
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The courts have also required that environmental concerns be taken into account when 
permitting the construction of affordable housing.
126
 However, in some cases, courts have given 
merely lip service to environmental concerns where it appeared that defendant municipalities 
were effectively using such concerns as a pretext to exclude lower-income residents.
127
 Some 
commentators have similarly characterized opponents of affordable housing who point to 
environmental concerns as “segregationist wolves concealed under the hides of environmental 
lambs.”128  
Nonetheless, the fear that New Jersey’s affordable housing regime may have adverse 
effects on the environment is not simply political rhetoric. For example, as a result of a 
successful builder’s remedy lawsuit, developers may construct a 360-unit, high density housing 
development in the Borough of Cranford next to a flood plain in order to facilitate affordable 
housing.
129
 This development could exacerbate flooding in an already flood-prone area that was 
ravaged by Hurricane Irene in 2011.
130
 Examples are anecdotal, but give some credibility to 
those who criticize the Mount Laurel doctrine from an environmentalist’s standpoint. 
Other critics point out that “rapid development of affordable housing strains the town’s 
infrastructure, and causes a surge in population, causing overcrowding in schools and potential 
traffic problems.”131 The court has stated that it is willing to waive housing obligations in the 
                                                 
126
 Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 218 (noting that sound planning and environmental impacts should be taken into 
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 Id. 
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face of real problems with strains on municipal infrastructure.
132
 Still, New Jersey’s affordable 
housing policy, like similar social programs,
133
 helped breed “middle-class resentment” against 
the burden of high state and local property taxes in New Jersey.
134
 
Local officials unwilling to take on the burden of added growth of any kind are often 
simply responding to pressures to balance the local budget.
135
 So called “fiscal zoning” seeks to 
“…create and maintain amenities…; to ensure that adequate infrastructure is 
available; to safeguard against natural hazards; to smooth the rate of change; to 
support productivity of agricultural and forest land; and to create positive 
externalities (for instance, by encouraging complimentary land uses to locate 
close to one another).”136  
 
In New Jersey particularly, local officials are under pressure to “keep taxes down, preserve open 
space and deliver quality public services.”137 Because a municipality is only answerable to its 
own residents, “it will do everything in its power to maintain the status quo.”138 In curtailing 
growth, municipalities may not be purposely excluding lower-income or minority residents at all 
or it may not be their primary concern.
139
  
Affordable housing advocates were not sold on COAH either.
140
 To them, it appeared 
that COAH had become increasing bureaucratic and less concerned with the needs of the poor.
141
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In particular, COAH allowed municipalities to downsize their affordable housing obligations for 
“seemingly trivial reasons” and did little to alleviate concerns that COAH housing was not 
reaching poorer residents.
142
 Later, COAH’s revisions to its third round rules even allowed 
credits for housing units planned but never built.
143
 In light of these shortcomings, even housing 
advocates did not argue against COAH’s abolition.144 In The Mount Laurel Doctrine and the 
Uncertainties of Social Policy in a Time of Retrenchment, Mallach cites “political legitimacy” as 
the major flaw that has kept the Mount Laurel doctrine from reaching its goals.
145
 However, 
political legitimacy is only a small part of the larger problem with implementing a lasting, 
working affordable housing plan in New Jersey: a strong public commitment for providing for 
the state’s neediest residents. 
COAH’s legacy will not be entirely negative. As of March, 2011, municipalities had 
completed or started construction on 169,799 low- and moderate-income homes and brought 
another 39,888 existing homes occupied by low- and moderate-income families up to code.
146
 
This puts New Jersey far ahead of states with similar programs.
147
 Anecdotally, suburban 
municipalities such as Mahwah, South Brunswick, and Franklin have produced more than 500 
affordable housing units each.
148
 Bedminster and Lawrence Township in Mercer County each 
produced over 1,000 such units.
149
  
D. The Builder’s Remedy 
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Mount Laurel II upheld the Builder’s Remedy.150 In that case, plaintiff-developers argued 
that such remedies were: 
(1) [E]ssential to maintain a significant level of Mount Laurel litigation, and the 
only effective method to date of enforcing compliance; (2) required by principles 
of fairness to compensate developers who have invested substantial time and 
resources in pursuing such litigation; and (3) the most likely means of ensuring 
that lower income housing is actually built.
151
 
 
Defendant-municipalities, on the other hand, argued that builders’ remedies would allow 
developers to determine how and where a municipality would meet its fair share obligation.
152
 
The court rejected the statement in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Twp. of Madison that “‘such 
relief will ordinarily be rare.’”153 Experience since Madison, the court reasoned, “has 
demonstrated to us that builder’s remedies must be made more readily available to achieve 
compliance with Mount Laurel.”154 The court went on to hold that a builder’s remedy should be 
granted where a developer-initiated Mount Laurel suit proposes “a project providing a substantial 
amount of lower income housing.”155 The court decided that a multi-unit development where 
twenty percent of units were designated as affordable had a substantial amount of lower income 
housing.
156
 The remaining units may be at a market rate, presumably middle- and upper-income 
housing.
157
 This market-rate housing “may be necessary to render the project profitable,”158 the 
court stated, adding that, “[i]f builder’s remedies cannot be profitable, the incentive for builders 
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to enforce Mount Laurel is lost.”159 Therefore, a reasonable developer may inflate the price of 
the market-rate units in order to subsidize the affordable ones. 
Once a trial court determines that a municipality’s zoning ordinance is exclusionary, the 
trial court may appoint a “special master” to work with the municipality in revising the ordinance 
to bring it into compliance with Mount Laurel.
160
 The court envisioned that the trial court and 
special master would work closely with a municipality in making the project suitable for it, so 
long as the municipality does not “delay or hinder the project” or “reduce the amount of lower 
income housing required.”161 
The New Jersey Legislature responded to Mount Laurel II by enacting the Fair Housing 
Act,
162
 and, in Hills Dev. Co. v. Twp. of Bernards, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld its 
constitutionality.
163
 In upholding a provision of the act that imposes a moratorium on builder’s 
remedy suits until five months after the newly created Council on Affordable Housing adopted 
criteria and guidelines for compliance,
164
 the court pointed out that the builder’s remedy is not a 
part of the State Constitution, but is “simply a method for achieving the ‘constitutionally 
mandated goal’ of providing a realistic opportunity for lower income housing needed by the 
citizens of this state.”165  
The Fair Housing Act provides that once a municipality has a COAH-approved fair share 
housing plan, it generally will not be subject to a builder’s remedy suit for a 10-year period 
following the approval.
166
 As one trial court decision read, “the remedy is the carrot,”167 and 
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because participation with COAH is voluntary, it would be difficult to entice municipalities to 
zone for affordable housing without the builder’s remedy.168 While some commentators claim 
that few builders’ remedies were ever actually awarded by the court and that panic over the 
remedy was unjustified,
169
 many affordable unit were built as a result of settlements in lawsuits 
in process.
170
  
New Jersey’s system has succeeded at creating a great deal of affordable housing.171 
Some commentators have also noted that by using the builder’s remedy as an incentive to zone 
for affordable housing, with the actual placement of units to be decided by local officials, 
haphazard zoning without regard to sound planning is avoided.
172
 However, because the court 
allowed developers to build four units of market-rate housing for every unit of affordable 
housing,
173
 the builder’s remedy meant that a municipality that loses a builder’s remedy suit 
would be required to absorb the market rate units as well.
174
 This led to major increases in 
                                                                                                                                                             
Twp. of Southampton, 338 N.J.Super. 103, 113 (App.Div. 2001), cert. denied, 169 N.J. 610, (2001), and stating that 
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were built on 1,600 acres in Bernards and Bedminster Townships, of which 560 were designated as affordable). 
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development in rural municipalities
175
 and, inevitably, the passage of the Fair Housing Act.
176
 As 
of April, 2011, 314 of New Jersey’s 566 municipalities had submitted plans for COAH to 
certify.
177
 However, as noted above, COAH’s methods have been the subject of scrutiny and 
criticism and the courts continue to grapple with what constitutes compliance with the Mount 
Laurel doctrine.
178
 
E. Voluntary Municipal Compliance 
In order to avoid a builder’s remedy suit and to exercise its zoning power “independently 
and voluntarily as compared to…court-ordered rezoning,”179 a municipality may file a fair share 
housing plan.
180
 However, municipal compliance with COAH has always been voluntary.
181
 The 
Court in Hills presumed the constitutionality of the Fair Housing Act despite concerns from 
developers that voluntary municipal cooperation would deter affordable housing.
182
 Absent 
certainty that this claim was true, the court dismissed this part of plaintiffs’ claim, particularly 
focusing on the fact that the legislation is presumed constitutionally valid and that the 
Legislature, through the Fair Housing Act, had given political credibility to the Mount Laurel 
doctrine.
183
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Later, in In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 and 5:95, 390 N.J.Super. 1 (App. Div., 2007), 
cert. denied, 192 N.J. 72 (2007), the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that “prior experience ‘has 
documented that if permitted to do so, municipalities are likely to utilize methodologies that are 
self-serving and calculated to minimize municipal housing obligations.’”184 For example, in 
rejecting a “pure growth share” approach that would only require municipalities to provide for 
affordable housing where they choose to grow, the court noted that this would permit 
discouragement of development to avoid affordable housing obligations.
185
 In other words, 
municipalities could avoid growth altogether to avoid providing for the construction of 
affordable housing. Or, as one commentator put it, “[w]hile local governments can learn, up to a 
point, to “live with” such laws, they are never fully reconciled to them, and are quick to seize on 
opportunities to weaken them, or eliminate them altogether.”186 In The Mount Laurel Doctrine 
and the Uncertainties of Social Policy in a Time of Retrenchment, author Alan Mallach argues 
that the entire concept of affordable housing is at risk.
187
 
In arguing for a new remedy, commentators have argued that COAH’s voluntary 
compliance mechanism is a structural deficiency, as it put COAH in the “‘unseemly position’ of 
having to sell the idea of compliance by sweetening deals for municipalities.”188 The courts, 
displeased with COAH’s role in this, have struck down COAH’s rules.189 With COAH out of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
advantages that we recognized in our Mount Laurel opinions. In many respects the Act promises results beyond 
those achieved by the doctrine as administered by the courts.”). 
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picture, it remains to be seen what the legislature’s role will be in enforcing compliance with the 
Mount Laurel doctrine. 
III. CRITIQUE OF A SYSTEM THAT GIVES DEVELOPERS AND 
MUNICIPALITIES CONTROL OVER DECISIONS REGARDING 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
 
A. A developer-driven model as a hindrance to affordable housing production 
Since at least 1983, the New Jersey courts have been well aware of the fact that the 
development community plays an essential role in ensuring the construction of affordable 
housing.
190
 The privatization of affordable housing construction has obvious benefits. First, it 
solves the problem without direct subsidies from the taxpaying public. Second, it does not further 
burden developers because, with a four-to-one ratio of market-rate to affordable units, developers 
may subsidize the cost of constructing the housing.
191
  
However, by allowing developers to decide how and where to construct affordable 
housing and affording them with such a large density bonus, the Mount Laurel doctrine may 
result in the creation of housing in places other than where they are needed, such as in rural areas 
away from jobs, transportation or social services. Additionally, by effectively giving court-
sanctioned zoning powers to developers, the doctrine further breeds resentment from local 
politicians and their constituents.
192
 Also, opponents of urban sprawl and environmental 
advocates resent that builder’s remedies have been awarded on pristine land.193 Some have called 
for limits on sprawl and incentives to invest in redeveloping urbanized areas.
194
 Even the courts 
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have embraced constructing affordable housing in redevelopment areas.
195
 While this sounds like 
a simple fix, it does not address the broader goals of Mount Laurel, which include desegregating 
the state along racial and economic lines.
196
 
In Hills, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Regional 
Contribution Agreements.
197
 The legislature abolished the use of RCAs in 2008, finding that it 
had “proven to not be a viable method of ensuring that an adequate supply and variety of housing 
choices are provided in municipalities experiencing growth.”198 In Trading Affordable Housing 
Obligations: Selling a Civic Duty or Buying Efficient Development?, author Joel Norwood 
argued that RCAs “fail to achieve their ultimate goal of reducing racial and economic 
segregation.”199 Norwood noted that RCAs allow municipalities to steer typically high-density 
affordable housing to municipalities with the infrastructure to handle such developments.
200
 
Further, funds are shifted to places that are in greater need of funding for affordable housing.
201
 
However, RCAs might not reduce segregation, a key component of the Mount Laurel 
decisions.
202
 Norwood’s solution would be for New Jersey to set higher goals for affordable 
housing. This way, shifting affordable housing obligations through RCAs would not affect the 
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number of units actually built in wealthier suburbs.
203
 Although RCAs could deter some of the 
problems with implementing the Mount Laurel decisions, such as the construction of high-
density housing in environmentally sensitive areas and areas where infrastructure cannot 
accommodate large populations, they would ultimately fail at bringing about the dream of Mount 
Laurel: social, racial, and economic integration.
204
 
S-1 is an example of a proposed alternative to New Jersey’s model for facilitating public 
housing, but it was struck down by the State Assembly.
205
 This alternative, sometimes referred to 
as the “pure growth share approach” has been adopted in Massachusetts and in Montgomery 
County in Maryland.
206
 The Montgomery County approach has been touted as the fix that will 
solve New Jersey’s affordable housing issues.207 Various conflicting groups have supported such 
a system. Municipal Amici in In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 and 5:97 supported the growth 
share rules
208
 and housing advocates have supported such a system as well.
209
 However, this plan 
also encourages municipalities to adopt master plans and zoning ordinances that retard growth.
210
 
The “mandatory 10% model” of Massachusetts’s 40B legislation was the inspiration for New 
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Jersey’s A-3447 legislation, which was introduced in October 2010.211 Like the Maryland plan, it 
has the potential for inhibiting growth, as evidence by the fact that the number of affordable units 
created in Massachusetts under the program has been small.
212
 Especially today, in a time where 
the housing industry (and the economy in general) is moving slowly, all growth is necessarily 
slowed. A growth share model like those adopted in Massachusetts and Montgomery County, 
Maryland would not likely address New Jersey’s affordable housing concerns.  
B. Voluntary municipal compliance as a hindrance to affordable housing production 
The voluntary compliance mechanism fashioned by the Mount Laurel decisions has not 
delivered on its promise to make affordable housing obligations more palatable for 
municipalities.
213
 While Mount Laurel has delivered in terms of actual numbers of affordable 
housing units built,
214
 all sides agree that the implementation of it has been fraught with needless 
bureaucracy. For example, The Asbury Park Press referred to COAH as “cumbersome, even at 
times contradictory” while defending its mission of requiring municipalities to provide their fair 
share of affordable housing.
215
 Governor Christie’s administration called COAH “hopelessly 
complex” and claimed that a “bureaucratic logjam…chilled housing development.216 Moreover, 
politicians on both sides of the aisle have called COAH “bureaucratically cumbersome and 
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outdated”217 Recently, both the legislative and executive branches of New Jersey government 
have responded to COAH’s clumsiness.218 
Governor Christie has said that “[m]unicipalities should be able to make their own 
decisions on affordable housing without being micromanaged and second guessed from 
Trenton.”219 However, if given the choice, developing municipalities would prefer not to 
facilitate the construction of affordable housing for the reasons stated in Part II.
220
 The modified 
growth share model espoused in COAH’s Third Round rules, far from bringing municipalities on 
board, only gave them “new numbers to argue against.”221  
Since the first Mount Laurel decision, the courts have required that every developing 
municipality zone for affordable housing.
222
 New Jersey, unlike many other states, is devoid of 
unincorporated areas and contains 566 municipalities, each with its own zoning power.
223
 Also 
unlike many other states, New Jersey is reaching “build-out,” that is, the state is running out of 
open space that is not environmentally protected.
224
 Rather than looking at affordable housing on 
a town-by-town basis, perhaps New Jersey should consider affordable housing regionally. 
Because local zoning boards will likely attempt to shift the burden of providing affordable 
housing onto neighboring municipalities, regional zoning boards would be more effective in 
addressing the state’s affordable housing needs. Aside from preserving open space, this can put 
affordable housing where lower income residents can actually use it, near infrastructure and 
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employment opportunities. Of course, this may run afoul of the goal of desegregating the state. 
By providing affordable housing near jobs, transportation, and infrastructure, this sort of model 
could create conditions where high concentrations of poor and minority residents live in certain 
designated areas. This would ensure that the social makeup of New Jersey remains the same as it 
has been since the first Mount Laurel decision. 
Nonetheless, the Mount Laurel line of cases must be reworked to eliminate the 
requirement that “each municipality” must affirmatively provide for affordable housing. 
However, this must be done without eliminating New Jersey’s commitment to affordable 
housing outside of traditionally poor urban cities. In order to do so, New Jersey should adopt a 
top-down approach where zoning for affordable housing comes from the state. This could be 
done by using the State’s Master Plan. Perhaps one small town has inadequate infrastructure or 
particular environmental sensitivities that make high-density housing illogical. In this case, a 
nearby town without those restrictions should offer affordable housing options. This is not to say 
that RCAs would be a good idea. The state should take care to ensure that certain municipalities 
are not the designated places for affordable housing simply because they are in need of funding 
for their own affordable housing projects. Certainly, these needs should not be ignored. 
However, rather than all of Essex County dumping its affordable housing in Newark, for 
example, regional approaches to affordable housing should take into consideration one of the 
main goals of the Mount Laurel cases, which is to desegregate the state. However, affordable 
housing should be constructed where it is most useful—near jobs and infrastructure, such as 
public transportation. Perhaps high rises would not make the most sense in a rural area, where 
jobs and public transportation are scarce, despite the fact that it has a less than desirable level of 
racial integration.  
Klein 30 
Furthermore, the builder’s remedy should not be used as an incentive for towns to 
provide for affordable housing and an incentive for developers to build it. Developers should not 
be in control of how and where affordable housing units are built any more than individual 
municipalities should be. Instead, the state should determine how and where affordable housing 
should be constructed. Oregon implemented such a top-down system, where local municipalities 
were required to adhere to statewide land use goals.
225
 The Oregon Land Conservation & 
Development Commission, the agency in charge of approving municipal land use plans, rejected 
52 of 53 plans for not complying with Goal 10, which dealt with affordable housing.
226
 This 
system shares many similarities with COAH. Both share the benefits of allowing local 
municipalities to create plans and leaving it up to the state to accept or reject those plans. 
However, in New Jersey, COAH only has the power to strip municipalities of their protection 
from builders’ remedy suits. In Oregon, the agency has the power to reject land use plans 
outright. New Jersey should adopt a similar approach.  
Inclusionary zoning should remain as a way to incentivize developers to build affordable 
housing. Where appropriate, the state should allow developers to increase densities in order to 
make inclusionary housing projects affordable. The benefits of inclusionary zoning are twofold. 
First, inclusionary zoning has the benefit of desegregating communities by allowing low- and 
moderate-income residents to live as neighbors with higher income residents. As Justice 
Frederick Hall pointed out in Mount Laurel I, desegregation is one of the goals of the doctrine
227
 
and what better way to achieve it by literally allowing poorer residents to live alongside 
wealthier ones. Secondly, density bonuses and inclusionary developments significantly increase 
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the overall supply of housing. If the overall supply of housing is increased, the rules of supply 
and demand would indicate that the cost of housing will decrease.  
A potential setback for a top-down approach where the state decides where to place 
affordable housing would be the unfairness to the municipalities who would be shouldered with 
the burden of absorbing the housing, and the increased costs of municipal services that come 
with it. This could be addressed through a tax sharing arrangement.
228
 For example, Minnesota 
has allowed pooling of tax revenues from commercial and industrial property in the Twin Cities 
area
229
 and even New Jersey has implemented a property tax-sharing scheme.
230
 The sense that 
each community can be thought of in an isolated manner is absurd, so if one community cannot 
handle increased development without severe planning concerns, then it should not be able to 
abandon its affirmative duties. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In a state where voters are committed to preserving what little open space they have left 
and where parochialism runs rampant in each of its 566 fiefdoms, any attempts by state 
government to restrict local zoning powers will be met with resistance. This is particularly true 
where distinctions between rich town and poor town are sharp.
231
 As many commentators have 
lamented, the real challenge to providing affordable housing in New Jersey “may not be a legal 
one, but a political one.”232 The entire discussion about reworking judge-made law may be for 
naught, as Governor Christie has expressed his intentions to politicize the state Supreme 
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Court.
233
 The immediate political challenge would be to convince the legislative and executive 
branches to push for affordable housing in the wake of COAH’s failure. The broader political 
challenge is to convince voters in a time when less taxes and smaller government are gaining 
favor that governmental control over the housing market will benefit the state. Broader still 
would be the challenge of reinvigorating voter interest in safety nets for the poor, interest that 
has been on the decline for 30 years. 
Although it may be a pipe dream in light of political resistance to state-ordered zoning 
mandates, New Jersey should take a top-down approach to zoning for affordable housing. By 
putting power in the hands of developers and municipalities, the dream of affordable housing in 
New Jersey may well be lost. Considering the political climate, however, a state-run approach is 
likely to be met with even more resistance than COAH was. Still, the basic premise of Mount 
Laurel I, that towns cannot use their zoning power to exclude, cannot be lost. 
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